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Scope
Broadly speaking, this dissertation studies fiscal policy mechanisms governments
set to retrieve the revenues needed for public expenditure. More concretely, the
main question is if these asymmetrical information mechanisms lead to a “desired
purpose” and whether they are indeed optimal and fair for both governments and
taxpayers. It appears that fiscal policies are among the main forces of unfairness
and are an obstacle for new small businesses and practitioners and may also ham-
per the economic growth of most (developing) countries.
One topic of this research is on tax evasion which is the illegal non-payment or
underpayment of tax. 1 It has been studied since it is an important costly phe-
nomenon that affects any government behavior in terms of designing a proper tax
structure and tax auditing policy that can reduce the extent of evasion. 2
The first chapter discusses what we already know about tax evasion and the op-
timal choice of the latter. Although the scope of this thesis is to go beyond a
comprehensive literature review, this initial phase builds an existing solid basis
to the rest of the work. This first part presents the different processes of how
1A different concept is the one of tax-avoidance: “the arrangement of one’s financial affairs
to minimize tax liability within the law”.
2See Slemrod (1990) and Slemrod & Yitzhaki (2002) for further discussion on optimal tax
theory.
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a taxpayer faces the “evasion choice”, as well as the different analytical models
which have been used in this field.
The second chapter focuses on a widespread practice for governments, which is
to gather observable and measurable characteristics of taxpayers and to group
the population into homogeneous categories in order to better estimate their real
gross income. Although it is common to keep income estimates hidden, in Italy
these are announced to the taxpayers before the latter are asked to fill in their
tax declarations. The mechanism used in Italy is called Sector Studies (in Italian
“Studi di Settore”) and relies on taxpayers’ gathered information both to partition
the population into fairly homogeneous clusters and to determine their presumed
income that they ought to declare. The Sector Studies mechanism relies on a
cut-off policy: once the government choses and announces the estimated income,
it is common knowledge that all taxpayers who declare less than this estimation
are surely audited. Thus, it is an asymmetrical information mechanism where
taxpayers enjoy the informational advantage.
The problem that a taxpayer faces when deciding their declaration in such a sce-
nario is analyzed. The principal aim is to understand whether this cut-off policy
is indeed optimal for the government and if it is fair to the taxpayers. Starting
from what is happening in Italy - that is the greatest part of the population de-
clares its estimated income but there is always a group that declares differently - a
theoretical model is constructed where the income distribution is fixed and audits
are costly for both government and taxpayers.
The main finding is the characterization of the solution to the taxpayer’s problem.
When taxpayers are risk-neutral and uniformly distributed in a given segment,
9the cut-off policy gives rise to three different groups into which taxpayers are en-
dogenously divided. The lowest group is audited with certainty, so that agents
bear the audit cost and no individual dishonestly reports her income (Compliance
Taxpayers). Reports in the middle group are equal to the estimated income (Over-
Declaration) so that no one is audited but individuals pay more taxes than due
(Fake Congruous). Declarations in the highest group are equal to the estimated
income so that no one is audited but since individuals’ real income is greater than
the estimated one, they pay less taxes than due and so evade (Evaders).
The third chapter addresses another fiscal mechanism concerning the exchange
of information and revenue-sharing in tax-treaties. Basically, the situation where
firms of a developed country can produce some revenues in a developing one is
modeled and analyzed. In such a situation, worldwide income taxation in the
country of residence is the legal dogma of international taxation commonly used.
This dogma is questioned from the perspective of relations with developing coun-
tries from a legal and economic perspective, and a modern and fair proposal for
tax treaties is made. It is shown under which conditions a developing and a de-
veloped country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged
truthfully and whether they should share revenues. Moreover, it proves how the
conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a tax audit system.
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Chapter 1
Tax Evasion Literature Review
Tax evasion is the illegal non-payment or underpayment of tax1. It has been
studied since it is an important costly phenomenon which affects any government
behavior in terms of designing a proper tax structure and tax auditing policy that
can reduce the extent of evasion2. All the previous studies on this topic can help
us in understanding the rational economic behavior of criminals3 but although tax
evasion is a real crime it is considered a special kind of illegal act. People rank the
crime of tax-evasion somewhere between stealing candies and stealing a motorbike.
Why is it so? Well, maybe because it is a fraud against a very special economic
agent who has the power to set some of the “rules of the game” (taxes and penal-
ties, for instance), the Government. It is clear that the core of this topic lies in
the “evasion decision” which is taken by each taxpayer and obviously involves a
“report” (declaration) that can be view as a “signal” given to the government. It
1A different concept is the one of tax-avoidance: “the arrangement of one’s financial affairs
to minimize tax liability within the law”.
2See Slemrod (1990) and Slemrod & Yitzhaki (2002) for further discussion on optimal tax
theory.
3Hindriks & Myles (2006) provide in their book an excellent introductory chapter to this
topic.
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can be that the taxation system and its enforcement rules may induce the taxpay-
ers to conceal or misrepresent part of their real income, and so evasion appears.
Boadway & Sato (2000) also study how the tax (enforcement and policy) systems
can affect unintentional compliance errors by taxpayers.
It can be shown that despite any likely moral commitment from a taxpayer to
contribute to the public’s expenditure, she could still be tempted to renege on her
payment to the government. It seems that avoiding to contribute is in each person’s
interest, and since governments are not omniscient the only way to ensure socially
responsible behaviors is to set a system of investigation and enforcement which can
prevent the treat of non compliance decisions. Hence governments need to gather
information in order to make up these systems. Thus governments must decide
some main taxpayers characteristics upon which it seems suitable to condition the
taxation and audit systems. On the other hand, taxpayers can try to manipulate
some of their characteristics to their own advantage (create the appearance of ma-
lingering, for instance). From these interactions one can understand that the tax
structure and the auditing and enforcement policies affect not only the amount of
evasion but even its means and the root cause of individual refusal to comply.
Studying, from the view point of standard microeconomic analysis, how an indi-
vidual taxpayer makes her decision, might be one of the main way to understand
what could be the best policies against tax evasion. The aim of this chapter is
to understand something of what we already know about tax evasion. There is a
large literature on the topic of tax evasion. It has started by Allingham & Sandmo
(1972) and surveyed by Cowell (1990) and Andreoni James & Jonathan (1998)
which treat the evasion decision as a choice of consumption under uncertainty and
that have studied how it is affected by the level of real income and the risk
aversion. Two first important results are that people with higher risk aversion
13
tend to evade less and that rich people tend to evade more.
These results, as well as many powerful others reported in the literature of tax
evasion, are founded on the assumption of UTILITY-MAXIMIZING behavior of
agents. To understand how we can get such outcomes and what they are con-
sequence of, let us consider a basic model, and let us start by an analysis of
taxpayer’s behavior. There is another interesting behavior: the government or
revenue-authorities one, it will be briefly discussed later on.
Our aim is to analyze the choice problem of a RATIONAL taxpayer predisposed
to be dishonest, i.e. without any moral surplus.
At the heart of such analysis lies an elementary lottery: “Is it worth taking the
chance of being caught and suffering a financial penalty?” Assuming that the eva-
sion decision involves only a single period, the taxpayer choice looks like one of the
following: comply or evade and how much. This lottery generates two possible
state of the world in one of which the taxpayer will be audited. So if she choses to
comply the two states give rise to the same payoff c′, if not, then there will be one
state where she will be caught and she will get c = c′ − f (where f is a possible
fine) as payoff, and another one where she will not be caught and so she will get
c′′; clearly c′′  c′  c. The exact nature of the lottery will be determined by:
• taxpayer’s financial resources, i.e. her real gross income y;
• a set of tax enforcing parameters τ := (p, s, t), where p is the probability of
being caught, s is the surcharge rate taxpayer has to pay for each unit of
money she conceals and t is a proportional tax.
Let us assume that the taxpayer’s payoff is her possible consumption, c, and since
it can vary across states, it can be viewed as a stochastic variable (Cowell (1990)):
c = [1− t]y + r · t · e
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where e is the difference between the gross income y and the declared income d
(i.e. e = y−d) and r is the rate of return on each amount of money of evaded tax:
r =
 1 with probability (1− p)−s with probability p
Where p is the audit probability. Hence, the expected rate of return is E(r) =
1− p− p · s. There can be three different cases:
1. Full evasion (e = y): in this case taxpayer’s payoff will be equal to c =
(1−t−t ·s)y with probability p (if caught) and c = y with probability (1−p)
(if not caught);
2. Partial evasion (e = (y−d) > 0): in this case taxpayer’s payoff will depend
on how much she wants to conceal so it will be equal to c = y − t(y + s · e)
with probability p and c = y + t(e− y) with probability (1− p);
3. Full compliance (e = 0): there will be no uncertainty and the taxpayer
will get c = (1− t)y in both states of the world.
Hence 0 ≤ e ≤ y, but the precise optimal point will depend on taxpayer’s prefer-
ences since e(·) will be a function of her gross income and tax enforcing parameters,
e(τ, y).
Let us denote with c′ the consumption that the taxpayer can achieve if audited
and with c′′ the consumption that she can achieve if not audited. A common as-
sumption in the literature is to use a Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function,
concave in consumption:
U(c′, c′′) = [1− p] · u(c′) + p · u(c′′)
where u(·) is a concave cardinal utility function. It important to note that this
assumption rules out both a state dependent utility, i.e. shame for being caught
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or delight for a successful evasion, and misperceptions by the taxpayer about the
probabilities of the two possible states of the world. Note that under these restric-
tions the absolute slope of any indifference curve at the point where it intersects
the 45o line must be exactly
(
1−p
p
)
4. Moreover concavity rules out the possibility
of risk-lovers. In order to fully characterize the taxpayer behavior has been added
a personal characteristic in addition to her gross income y, a sort of risk aversion
measure, a, which measures the concavity of the utility function and on which the
optimal evasion will also depend, e(τ, y, a). A first interesting result is that an
increase of risk aversion will reduce evasion. If a∗-type has a greater risk aversion
than a-type and if e(τ, y, a) > 0 then:
e(τ, y, a∗) < e(τ, y, a).
Another common assumption is that the Absolute Risk Aversion, defined as
−uacc(c)
uac (c)
, is a decreasing function of c. It is well known that one important implica-
tion is that ceteris paribus, for any particular a,
e(τ, y, a) < e(τ, y∗, a)
if and only if y < y∗. Hence an increase in the gross income y:
• will increase the amount of evasion e if the relative risk aversion, − c·uacc(c)
uac (c)
,
is a decreasing function of c;
• will not change the amount of evasion e if the relative risk aversion is a
constant function of c;
• will decrease the amount of evasion e if the relative risk aversion is an
increasing function of c.
4To see this, observe that for any consumption prospect c, the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption if caught, c′′ and consumption if escape, c′ is
[
(1−p)·u′(c′)
p·u′(c′′)
]
.
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It is clear now that people with higher risk aversion tend to evade less. The result
that people with higher income tend to evade more is derived under the assump-
tion of decreasing relative risk aversion in consumption c.
In order to proceed the argument of this chapter it is useful to consider a previous
model by Shlomo (1974) which was one of the earliest and best-known models of
tax evasion. The former authors were mainly interested in the effect of an higher
tax rate t on the amount of evasion e. Their result, while intuitive, shows the dif-
ficulties and subtleties of studying tax compliance. Their model was really similar
to the previous one but there was a change in the taxpayer payoff if caught: their
penalty was not proportional to the amount of tax evaded t · e, i.e. −s · e instead
of −s · e · t. We now try to answer the following question: How does evasion e
change with the tax rate t? Considering the following expected utility:
E
(
U
)
= [1− p] · u((1− t) · y + t · e)+ p · u((1− t) · y − s · e)
Examining the expected utility the effect of an higher t is ambiguous. To un-
derstand why note that an increase in t has two distinct effects. First, it lowers
taxpayer net income (1− t)y. Now, since by assumption the absolute risk aversion
is a decreasing function of consumption c, then this change should make people
more risk averse regarding any e and so less likely to accept more evasion. How-
ever, there is a second effect since as t rises, the return to evade goes up while the
penalty to getting caught, s, stays unchanged. This asymmetry should encourage
evasion. Allingham & Sandmo (1972) show which effects dominates depend on
how fast the absolute risk aversion declines, i.e., on the third derivative of the util-
ity function. Shlomo (1974) show that if the penalty is proportional to the amount
of tax evaded, −s · t · e, as in the first version of the model, then the amount of
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evasion e will be reduced when the tax rate t increases5. Another interesting re-
sult is that an increase in the probability of detection, p, must reduce tax evasion, e.
Since a gamble which has an expected value lower than zero will not be chosen by
a risk-averse agent, the government just needs to assure such condition by setting
the penalty rate, s sufficiently high; but in the real world governments don’t set
such high penalties.
A generalization of the simple Allingham-Sandmo model is to account for repeated
nature of reporting decision. This is quite natural since declaring an income is an
annual event in most of the countries and taxpayers may condition their reports
not only on future expectation but also on past reports and audit experiences.
For instance, Greenberg (1984) provides a simple example where the authority
has one-period memory and the taxpayers are put into three different categories.
Those in category 1 have an audit probability p1 =
1
2
p where p = 1/[1 + s]. Those
in category 2 have a smaller probability: p2. Members in category 3 are always
audited. In each period, taxpayers are shifted between groups: Those in category
1 who are caught cheating are moved to category 2; those in category 2 who are
audited are returned to category 1 if found to be true but are put into category
3 if found cheating; category 3 is a black hole for habitual evaders, i.e., once in
it, the taxpayer stays there. If the taxpayers know about this rule, then it can be
shown that, in equilibrium, all the taxpayers will be disposed as a convex combi-
nation between category 1 and 2, that is, α taxpayers in category 1 where everyone
cheats and (1− α) in category 2 where everyone comply, such that α is less than
the arbitrarily small minimum tolerable amount of evasion and αp1 = (1 − α)p2.
5This because for any given e, an increase in t makes the expected consumption fall and
increases the variance so that compliance is more attractive.
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There will be no one in category 3.
A limit of Allingham & Sandmo (1972) is that it considers a constant proba-
bility of audit. In Italy, for instance, audits are likely to rely on the amount of
declared income rather than being purely random. In the literature, a general
framework in which the probability of audit is a function of the declared income
and so determined at equilibrium, has already been developed. This framework
has been used for a twofold purpose: to generate both prediction about evasion
and the optimal audit strategy. Following this general framework models in the
literature generally fall into two groups. The first assumes that the revenue au-
thorities can announce and commit to its audit rule before taxpayers declarations.
6 Contrastingly, the second type of models assume that since the revenue author-
ity cannot announce and commit to its audit rule it decides which taxpayers to
audit after all the incomes have been declared. 7 Andreoni James & Jonathan
(1998) carefully explain these two different type of models. Previous studies in
this area examine the possibility of using the profile of declarations as a signal
for the government. For instance Sanchez-Villalba (2006), show that the optimal
auditing strategy is (weakly) increasing in the other taxpayers’ declarations. The
higher these declarations, the more likely a low-income declared is an evader. This
reasoning is assumed (Alm & McKee (2004)) to be behind the method used to de-
termine which taxpayers to audit. But while Alm & McKee (2004) is a laboratory
experiment where the (ad hoc) policy is contingent on the distribution of income
declarations in Sanchez-Villalba (2006) the agency’s optimal strategy is derived
instead of assumed.
6These models have much in common with standard principal-agent problem.
7This kind of models make use of sequential equilibrium concept from standard game-theory.
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Let us now consider the following extension of the previous model. Assume that
there is a population of taxpayers and each of them receives a true income y ∈ [l, h]
(where l and h are respectively the lowest and the highest level of income). True
income is distributed according to a density function f(y) so that F (·) is the asso-
ciated distribution function. The assumption of perfect detection is kept, i.e. that
the government can learn the true income by performing an audit, moreover we
introduce the fact that the government has an exogenously determined budget B
and that each audit has a cost c.
The timing of this game is as follows: first each taxpayer makes her declaration
d8, and pays taxes accordingly t(d), then the government audits a subset of them.
For a taxpayer of true income y the expected utility is the following:
E
(
U(d)
)
=
(
1− p(d))U(y − t(d))+ p(d)U(y − t(d)− ϑ[t(y)− t(d)])
Where p(d) is the probability of audit associated to the declaration d and ϑ[t(y)−
t(d)] is the penalty (and ϑ[0] = 0).
What is the objective of the government? Most of the literature assumes that
government’s objective is to maximize the expected net revenue (tax and penalty
revenue less audit cost). Hence the government maximize the following:
h∫
d
{
p(d)E
[(
t(y) + ϑ[t(y)− t(d)])∣∣∣∣d]+ (1− p(d))t(d)
}
dF (d)
Where E[· · · |d] is the conditional expectation given the declaration d, d is the
lowest declaration made by any taxpayer, and F (d) is the induced distribution
function over d.
8Which generally is at most equal to the true income, d ≤ y, see Scotchmer (1986).
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The government must meet the budget constraint:
c
h∫
d
p(d) dF (d) ≤ B
An alternative to such a policy that we do not consider here, would be to allocate
resources in order to maximize social welfare.
Consider now the situation where the tax authority commits to an audit rule
before taxpayers make their declaration. In such a framework the optimal gov-
ernment strategy (for a fixed budget constraint) usually involves a cut-off rule.
The cut-off rule was first introduced in the tax evasion literature by Reinganum &
Wilde (1985), while Sanchez & Sobel (1993) provide a discussion of these types of
models. The simplest cut-off rule consists in, a limit value w, and an audit policy
with some audit probability p for declarations d below the threshold value w, but
a zero audit probability for all the declarations above it. The limit value w is
chosen so that the budget constraint is just exhausted at equilibrium. The audit
probability p, is chosen to be just enough so that all the taxpayer with true gross
income below w report truthfully. Moreover, if the tax and the penalty are linear
and taxpayers are risk-neutral, the optimal value of p is 1
(1+s)
(Scotchmer (1986)),
but when p is so, taxpayers with true gross income above w chose to declare pre-
cisely w, paying t · w and bearing no-risk of being audited.
Finally, Sanchez & Sobel (1993) show that such a simple cut-off audit rule max-
imizes the expected government net revenue only under quite restrictive assump-
tions such as risk-neutral taxpayers and linear penalty s.
Chapter 2
Tax Evasion and cut off policy -
A Case Study in Italy:
Sector Studies
This chapter analyzes a fiscal mechanism used in Italy, which in Italian is called
“Studi di Settore” (Sector Studies). This mechanism relies on information gathered
on taxpayers to both partition the population into fairly homogeneous clusters
and to determine the presumed income they should declare. When this estimated
income is announced, before taxpayers fill out their tax returns, their optimal
declaration strategies lead the taxpayer population to be endogenously divided
into three homogeneous groups, one of which pays more taxes than are due, the
second group comply but bears the audit cost, while the third evades and it is not
audited. This result is close to the Italian situation where the greatest number of
taxpayers make a tax declaration according to the announced cluster income, but
there are always those who declare less and so are audited.
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2.1 Introduction
It is a widespread practice for governments to gather observable and measurable
characteristics of taxpayers and to group the population into homogeneous cate-
gories in order to better estimate their real gross income. While it is common to
keep those income estimations hidden (e.g. France), in Italy they are announced
to the taxpayers before they are asked to fill their tax returns. This mechanism
is called Sector Studies and it consists in a cut-off policy: once the government
chooses and announces the estimated income, it is common knowledge that all
those taxpayers who declare less than this estimation are surely audited.
The policy of introducing additional information eliminates uncertainty for the
taxpayers. Once the estimated income is announced, taxpayers’ payoff depend
upon their own decisions; but it also gives a strong incentive to declare the esti-
mated income.
This chapter focuses on the problem a taxpayer faces when deciding his tax decla-
ration in such a scenario. The principal aim is to understand if this cut-off policy is
indeed optimal for the government and if it is fair for the taxpayer. Starting from
what is happening in Italy, that is the majority declare their estimated income
but there is a minority who do not, a model is constructed where there is a fixed
distribution of income in the economy and audits are costly for both government
and taxpayers.
The first model on this topic was proposed by Allingham & Sandmo (1972), and
their aim was to understand if higher tax rates generate more or less compliance.
Their model was then generalized by Pencavel (1979), Cowell (1981) and Sandmo
2.1. INTRODUCTION 23
(1981) which make income endogenous by adding labour supply 1. The research
in the area was then surveyed by Cowell (1990) and Andreoni James & Jonathan
(1998).
Reinganum & Wilde (1985) first introduced the cut-off rule 2, but while in their
model taxes and fines are lump-sum and audit are costly only for the government
in the model developed here taxes and fines are set proportionally to the declared
or real income and audits are costly for both the government and the taxpayer.
These assumptions are more realistic and closer to the situation in Italy.
In a model with risk-neutral taxpayers3 that are distributed in a given segment
we prove that the cut-off policy gives rise to three different groups into which
taxpayers are endogenously divided. 1) A group is audited with certainty: these
taxpayers bear the audit cost and no individual dishonestly reports their income
(this group can be defined as Compliance Taxpayers). 2) Tax reports in the middle
group are equal to the estimated income so that no one is audited but individuals
pay more taxes than are due (this group is a Fake Congruous group). 3) Tax
declarations in the highest group are equal to the estimated income so that no
one is audited but since individuals’ real income is greater than the estimated one,
they pay less taxes than are due and so evade (this group is defined as Evaders).
The focus of this chapter is the taxpayer’s behavior and in order to understand it
1Tonin (2011) builds a model of the labour market that predicts a spike in declared income
at the minimum wage level, and supports this result with evidence based on Hungarian data.
2Also Sanchez & Sobel (1993) discuss these types of models.
3While Risk-Neutrality is a nice feature that simplify the discussion in this paper, it can be
shown that all the results hold even without it. Note that there is not uncertainty about taxpayer
payoff since all the elements of the game are common knowledge.
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one needs to analyze the government problem. So also the solution to the govern-
ment problem has been characterized. The optimal threshold value, as noted by
Reinganum & Wilde (1985), is chosen so that the audit budget is just exhausted
at equilibrium.
The next section briefly presents a description of the Italian system. Section 2.3
describes the model and characterizes the solution to taxpayer and government
problems. Section 2.4 describes the equilibrium. Section 2.5 provides a discussion
about the result and further research perspectives while section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Description of the System
The Sector Studies were introduced in the Italian regulations in 19934 in order
to overcome the incongruities of the old fiscal system5 and to regulate and avoid
possible conflicts between the revenue-authorities and taxpayers.
One can see the Sector Studies as an instrument which is used to estimate the
capability of producing revenues of medium-small businesses and practitioners.
The Sector Studies are accomplished with a systematic gathering of data. There
are two types, fiscal and structural data, which characterize the taxpayer’s activity
and the economic framework where it is supposed to be developed. Therefore the
Sector Studies allow one to estimate the taxpayer’s revenues, identifying the
potential taxpayer’s capability of producing revenues and the features which can
4As reported by the Societa´ per gli Studi di Settore (Sose) they were introduced by D.L.
30/08/1993, n. 331.
5The previous fiscal system, in 1970, linked the determination of firm’s and autonomous
worker’s income to the published accounts, in a way that the system favored the heedful evaders
and penalized the honest but forgetful taxpayers.
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affect it. Moreover, the Sector Studies take into account some peculiarities of the
geographical area in which the taxpayers’ activity is developed (externalities, etc.).
The single Sector Study is achieved through the following legal process:
Data gathering. The data gathering uses two different sources depending on
the Sector Study. If it is a new one, an initial version is created using
data collected from questionnaires which taxpayers are asked to compile.
Instead, an advanced form of data gathering is used for an already achieved
Sector Study through an analysis of previous declarations. Independently
of the approach used, data are screened so that only significant information
will continue to the next stage in the process.
Significant Data Elaboration. A first analysis leads to the choice of the main
variables through which homogeneous groups (called clusters) of taxpayers
are detected. Then any cluster is normalized in the sense that outliers are
not considered in its definition.
Performing Gerico. Gerico is the software which applies the Sector Studies,
processing information and computing the foreseen revenues. At this stage
it assigns to any of the former clusters a function (for instance, F : Ci → R+,
where Ci can be a single cluster) which gives the expected income for that
cluster.
Implementing the Sector Study. Finally gerico assigns every taxpayer to one
or more clusters, according to her structural features, which are objective
so that taxpayers cannot choose them at this stage, is assigned through
gerico . The foreseen income is computed and produced by Gerico through
a regression on the taxpayers features taking into account also some feasible
correctives (environmental factors for instance).
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The following tables present some important empirical data concerning the Sector
Studies:
Tab 1 - The Sector Studies audience (Sose 2005)
Fiscal Year Number of Sector Studies Obliged Taxpayers Non-obliged Taxpayers Total Taxpayers
1998 45 1.442.351 3.736.799 5.179.150
1999 86 2.128.336 3.041.430 5.169.766
2000 129 3.023.068 2.136.405 5.159.473
2001 168 3.786.079 1.366.416 5.152.495
2002 202 4.197.813 949.794 5.147.607
2003 228 4.424.498 716.920 5.141.418
2004 206 4.440.108 701.277 5.141.385
Tab 2 - Data concerning the overall audience (Sose 2005)
2003 2004 2003/2004
Non congruous Congruous Tot Non congruous Congruous Tot % rising
Taxpayers 901.980 2.221.199 3.123.179 1.003.562 2.189.613 3.193.175 2,24%
% composition 28,88% 71,12% 100,00% 31,43% 68,57% 100,00%
% of Fitted 36,36% 46,90% 28,99%
The previous tables shows that italian taxpayers use to declare a congruous income
so that the Sector Studies prophecy is almost always realized, but still there is
a group who declare a non congruous income. Our objective is to understand,
through a specific model, why this is so.
2.3 Model
The model developed here focuses both on the evasion decision and on the opti-
mal government threshold value within a given cluster. For simplicity one assumes
that there is a population of taxpayers each of which possesses a true income Ii
which can be viewed as the taxpayer’s type. There is a continuum of types since
true income is distributed along a continuum between l and h (where l and h are
respectively the lowest and the highest level of income within a given cluster6)
6One assumes the lowest level of income l to be high enough to assure a non negative profit
so that there is not exit in the model.
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according to the density function f(I) where F (·) is the associated distribution
function. Perfect detection is assumed, i.e. the government can learn a taxpayer’s
type (their true income) by performing a costly audit 7.
The timing of this game8 can be represented as follows: first, the government,
knowing f(I), choses and announces the gerico income, g, to the taxpayers.
Then, each taxpayer, knowing their type Ii, submits their income declaration di,
and pays taxes accordingly. In doing so, each taxpayer knows that the probability
of being audited is zero if the declared income is congruous (i.e. at least equal to
the gerico’s one) and it is equal to one if not9. Finally, the revenues-authorities,
knowing both the gerico income and all the declarations, undertake audits ac-
cordingly to the already committed audit rule, and collect fines where due.
It should be clear that the revenues-authorities in this setup do not make any
choice since the cut-off rule which fixes the audit probability to one for all those
who have declared less than the gerico income, but leaves unaudited all that have
declared it or more, is exogenously stated by law.
2.3.1 Taxpayer Problem
Taxpayer i’s problem consists of choosing how much income to declare in order to
maximize their utility function.
7A different assumption is used by Snow & Warren (2005) who show how an increase in
taxpayer uncertainty about the amount of tax evasion that will be detected affects the choice of
evasion.
8One assumes that the Sector Study under analysis have already been completed and ap-
proved.
9Even if the Italian regulation states that declaring a congruous income does not exclude one
from an audit, in practice the probability of an audit is drastically reduced to nearly zero.
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Taxpayers are uniformly distributed on the [l, h] segment and their income is their
type. Taxpayers are assumed to be risk-neutral, so that their utility function is
linear in disposable income:
ui = Ii − tdi − ai
[
max
{
0, (Ii − di)
}
(t+ f) + c
]
(2.1)
where Ii is taxpayer i
′s gross income, t ∈ (0, 1) is the tax rate, di ∈ [0,+∞) is
taxpayer i′s income declaration, ai ∈ {0, 1} is a boolean value defined as:
ai =
 1 if di < g and so taxpayer i is audited0 if di ≥ g and so taxpayer i is not audited (2.2)
and f ∈ (0, 1) is the additional rate taxpayer i should pay if caught cheating while
c ∈ <+ is the fixed cost each taxpayer suffers if audited.
All the parameters of the problem are common knowledge. Moreover, since at
this decision node the threshold value g is already decided and announced by the
government, the taxpayers have no uncertainty. This lack of uncertainty is due to
both the fact that taxpayers know about the cut-off policy and the assumption of
perfect detection.
Therefore, once taxpayer i knows about her type Ii, her problem is to maximize
(2.1) choosing di. Since there is no uncertainty, the optimal declaration will be a
function of the taxpayer’s type Ii. Hence two cases need to be considered: one is
when Ii ≥ g and the other is when Ii < g. In both cases, taxpayer i has to decide
how much to declare.
The first case is straightforward and it is characterized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1 High type taxpayers (Ii ≥ g) always choose to declare the threshold
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value g, paying tg and bearing no risk of an audit. Formally,
d∗(Ii, g) = g ∀Ii ≥ g (2.3)
Proof. From the comparison of the utilities a high type taxpayer (Ii ≥ g) gets,
when they declare less than g (udi<gi = (1 − t)Ii − (Ii − di)f − c), more than g
(udi>gi = Ii − tdi) or exactly g (udi=gi = Ii − tg). 
In the second case, i.e. when Ii < g, since there is no uncertainty, a threshold
g declaration leads to an utility of udi=gi = Ii − tg. Of course, even for low type
taxpayers, this strategy strictly dominates declaring more than g. This follows
by the fact that the audit probability is a step function (2.2) . Moreover, also
by the previous fact, it follows that cheating, i.e. di < Ii or declaring more than
real income, but less than g, are both strictly dominated strategies by the com-
pliance strategy, i.e. declaring Ii, paying tIi of taxes and c as audit cost. Hence,
it is clear that the cut-off policy, by setting an audit probability equal to one if
the declaration di is below the threshold g, eliminates evasion making compliance
much more attractive than evasion. However, since being audited is not costless
for the taxpayer, the cut-off policy allows them to avoid such cost c, by a congru-
ous declaration. It follows by the previous argument that the cheapest congruous
declaration is the threshold declaration di = g.
Low type taxpayers’ decisions depend on the comparison between compliance and
threshold declaration as follows:
d∗(Ii, g) =

Ii if Ii < I¯
∈ {Ii, g} if Ii = I¯
g if Ii > I¯
(2.4)
where I¯ := g − c
t
is the type which is indifferent between the two strategies.
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Jointly the lemma 1 and the equation (2.4) present the solution to the taxpayer
problem.
Intuitively, high type taxpayers evade since they bear no risk of an audit, while low
type taxpayers are split into two groups, i.e. there is a gross income level I¯ below
which taxpayers comply and above which taxpayers declare the threshold value g.
This implies that a taxpayer’s declaration is (strictly) increasing for income levels
Ii ∈ [l, I¯) and constant for Ii ∈ (I¯ , h].
The latter results are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2 A taxpayer’s optimal declaration strategy is: (1) (weakly) increasing
in their type Ii. and (2) it is the same for all taxpayers. Formally:
(1)
∂d∗(Ii, g)
∂Ii
≥ 0 (2.5)
Proof. The first follows by direct inspection of equation (2.5). For the second
part, it is the result of I¯ being a constant that is independent of the taxpayer’s
type whose strategy has being analysed. 
To a characterize further the taxpayers optimal declaration strategy, the next
proposition shows how it is influenced by the threshold value g:
Proposition 2.1 Given a type Ii, (1) there exists a critical value g¯ := Ii +
c
t
for
which taxpayers’ optimal declaration strategy makes a downward jump. Moreover,
taxpayers’ optimal declaration strategy is (2) (weakly) increasing in the threshold
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value g, below g¯ and (3) constant above it. Formally:
(1) d∗(Ii, g) =

g if g < g¯
∈ {Ii, g} if g = g¯
Ii if g > g¯
(2.6)
(2)
∂d∗(Ii, g)
∂g
≥ 0 if g ∈ [l, g¯) (2.7)
(3)
∂d∗(Ii, g)
∂g
= 0 if g ∈ (g¯, h] (2.8)
Proof. For the first part, it is simply expressing the equation 2.4 in terms of g.
The second and the third follow by direct inspection of equation 2.6. 
The idea is straightforward: given a type Ii, as the threshold value g increases
the optimal declaration increases accordingly up to the point where declaring g
and paying tg is as costly as declaring Ii, paying tIi and suffering the cost c of an
audit. Above such point, a taxpayer of type Ii prefers to comply rather than being
congruous. It is important to note that the model gives rise to an empty segment
in the distribution of the tax declarations.
2.3.2 Government Problem
The government’s objective is to raise revenue by choosing the threshold value g
taking into account the distribution of income F (I) and that the cut-off policy is
already stated. Moreover, assume that the government has a budget B which is
exogenously determined, and since any single audit has a cost of k the government’s
expenditure can be at most B. For a taxpayer of true income di the expected utility
is the following:
E
(
U(di)
)
= tdi + Pr(di < g)
[
max
{
0, (Ii − di)
}
(t+ f)− k
]
(2.9)
32 CHAPTER 2. A CASE STUDY IN ITALY: SECTOR STUDIES
The government anticipates taxpayers’ strategies, and since the gross income’s
density function f(I) is common knowledge, the government knows that to any
given threshold value g, it has to audit each taxpayer whose declaration is below
the critical level of income I¯ = g− c
t
, and it gains tIi
10 for each of them. Moreover,
all the other taxpayers (that is above I¯) will declare the threshold value g so that
the government will acquire tg from each of them.
Therefore the government solves the following problem
max
g
I¯∫
l
(tI − k) dF (I) +
h∫
I¯
tg dF (I) (2.10)
subject to k
I¯∫
l
dF (I) ≤ B (2.11)
The solution to this problem depends on the actual income distribution and in
order to characterize the solution recall the assumption of a uniformly distributed
taxpayer on the [l, h] segment.
Proposition 2.2 The best response of the government to taxpayers strategies is
to set a threshold value equal to:
g∗ = l +
c
t
+
B
k
(h− l) (2.12)
We obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3 The optimal government threshold strategy is : (1) increasing in its
budget B, (2) increasing in taxpayers audit cost c, (3) decreasing in the tax rate t,
10This because the government knows that all such taxpayers will declare truthfully.
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(4) decreasing in its audit cost k, (5) increasing in the highest cluster income level
h, (6) decreasing in the lowest cluster income level l. Formally:
(1)
∂g∗(·)
∂B
> 0 (2)
∂g∗(·)
∂c
> 0 (3)
∂g∗(·)
∂t
< 0
(2.13)
(4)
∂g∗(·)
∂k
< 0 (5)
∂g∗(·)
∂h
> 0 (6)
∂g∗(·)
∂l
< 0
Proof. By direct inspection of equation (2.12). 
Intuitively, since the government cannot overreach its budget B, and since, by law,
it has to audit all the taxpayers who are declaring less than the threshold value,
g∗ will be chosen so that the audit budget B is just exhausted in equilibrium, and
hence the g∗ will be an increasing function of the audit budget.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that if one assumes an unconstrained
maximization for the government, the threshold value g is not set to the highest
cluster income level h (see appendix A).
2.4 Equilibrium
Once the private information variables (the government’s budget B and each tax-
payer’s type Ii) are realized, the equilibrium appears to be unique: partial overdec-
laration. The taxpayers are divided into three groups:
1. Evaders (h ≥ Ii > g∗): these taxpayers declare the threshold value g∗, pay
tg∗ and since they are not audited they evade an amount of tax, t(Ii − g∗);
2. Fake Congruous (I¯∗ ≤ Ii < g∗)11: taxpayers in this gorup declare the
threshold value g∗ and pay tg∗ even if their real income Ii is lower. Hence
11Where I¯∗ = g∗ − ct .
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they pay an extra amount of tax t(g∗ − Ii) (over-declaration) and they are
not audited;
3. Compliance Taxpayers (l ≤ Ii ≤ I¯∗): these taxpayers comply, truthfully
reporting their real gross income Ii and paying tIi but since they are audited
they bear a cost c.
Therefore, the government bears a total cost of k
I¯∗∫
l
dF (I) without earning any fines
since evaders are not caught. Note that the establishment of the Fake Congruous
group is due to the taxpayers audit cost c. The previous result are summarized in
the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3 The unique equilibrium appears to be the case of partial over-
declaration: high type taxpayers (Ii > g∗) evade and are not audited as middle
type taxpayers (I¯∗ ≤ Ii < g∗) who declare more than their real income, while low
type taxpayers (l ≤ Ii ≤ I¯∗) comply and are audited with certainty.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of the payoff function of the players
(equation 2.1 and 2.10), their optimal strategies (lemma 2.2 and 2.3 and proposi-
tion 2.2) and the assumption of a uniform distribution. 
The proposition highlights the fact that the chosen cut-off policy, although allows
for optimal government strategy, penalizes low-type taxpayers either in bearing
the audit cost or in paying more than due taxes. On the other hand, it gives a
great incentive to evade for high-type taxpayers who are never audited.
2.5 Discussion and Future Research Perspectives
The model developed here gives a plausible explanation of what is happening in
Italy. It is easy to see how a lot of small businesses and practitioners flatten
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their declaration to the gerico value, but there are still those who declare a non
congruous income. While this model gives a twofold explanation to the former
phenomenon, that is either taxpayers have a greater real income than the gerico’s
one or they prefer to pay taxes accordingly to the sector study in order not to bear
the cost of an audit, it gives one motivation to the latter, i.e. they prefer to bear
the cost of an audit rather than paying taxes accordingly to the sector study, since
it is less costly for them to do so.
Finally, the model captures the importance of the partial over-declaration phe-
nomenon which follows by the cut-off policy decided by the Italian regulatory
authority. Consider that there might be a case where, within a cluster, the total
amount declared could actually exceed total income because of the fake congruous
over-declaring.
An open question is why the Sector Studies set the audit probability equal to
one for reports below the threshold value? It is true that this gives to taxpayers
whose type is lower than the threshold value the incentive for honest declarations.
However using the model in this paper one can notice that the probability that
eliminates evasion which gives the same incentives is lower than one, although it
implies a reduction of the fake congruous group. We give some hints on this point
in the appendix B where we characterize the solution to the taxpayer’s problem
in such scenario. The idea can be that the government wants to keep this group
as numerous as possible. It may be also possible that the explanation is political
or maybe it lies in the income distribution. Maybe the income variability within
a cluster is very low and so the government is almost sure about its estimation or
perhaps it is just what it wanted to show. If the former hypothesis is correct then
the audit probability would be a decreasing function of the income distribution
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variance. This question is left open for further investigation.
2.6 Conclusions
The question of a taxpayers’ optimal strategy in the presence of this kind of cut-off
rule is relevant because it is not unusual for such policies to be the main source of
unfairness and an obstacle for new small businesses and practitioners. Implement-
ing this policy requires a lot of information to be gathered by the government and,
under these circumstances, while the governments best policy consists of setting
a threshold value accordingly to its audit budget, a taxpayer’s optimal strategy
consist of either declaring the threshold value or declaring their true income ac-
cording to their type. Taxpayers are therefore divided, accordingly to their types,
into three homogeneous groups; one of which pays more taxes than due (over-
declaration), another complies but bears the audit cost, while the third evades
and it is not audited.
Chapter 3
Tax treaties and the allocation of
taxing rights between developed
and developing countries
Global income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma of international
taxation. This chapter questions this dogma from the perspective of relations with
developing countries from a legal and economic perspective, and makes a modern
and fair proposal for tax treaties. This work will show under which conditions a
developing and a developed country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where infor-
mation is exchanged truthfully and whether they should share revenues. Moreover,
it will demonstrate how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implemen-
tation of a tax audit system.
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3.1 Motivation
Worldwide income taxation in the country of residence is a global legal dogma of
international taxation (see Mc Daniel (2007); Fleming et al. (2009)). Conceived
to fit relations between countries with symmetrical flows of capital, this dogma
gradually spread throughout the world (see Christians (2010)). This research
questions this dogma from the perspective of relations between developed and de-
veloping countries for two reasons. From a legal perspective, expanding the taxing
sovereignty beyond the national borders leads to overlaps with the sovereignty of
the state of source and international double taxation may arise. From a tax policy
perspective, the deduction of the foreign tax by the country of residence1, reduces
the possibility of developing countries to attract foreign capital through tax pol-
icy. A reduction of such tax by the country of source turns into a lower deduction
against taxes due in the country of residence. This achieves capital export tax
neutrality, but eliminates the possibility to reduce taxes by countries in order to
attract foreign capital.
This chapter regards this outcome in conflict with international tax justice and a
fair allocation of taxing powers (see Pistone & Goodspeed (2010)). In particular,
in the presence of unidirectional flows of income or capital, as is typically the case
for relations with developing countries, worldwide income taxation by the country
of residence allows capital exporting countries to link up to their taxing jurisdic-
tion income that has in fact been sourced or produced outside of its borders. This
mechanism therefore interferes with the tax policy decisions of the country in con-
nection with those territories where the income was generated. The ambition of
this work is to present a solution to replace the worldwide income tax principle. A
modern view, that takes information sharing seriously, is needed to make use of tax
1i.e. relief for juridical double taxation by the so-called foreign tax credit method.
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treaties as an instrument for a fairer allocation of taxing powers and co-operation
between developing and developed countries.
3.2 Related legal and economic literature
The features of the worldwide income taxation in the country of residence policy
can be summarized as follows: When - as it is often the case - taxes levied in the
developing country are lower than those applicable in the developed country, the
latter will in fact levy its own taxes on income produced in the territory of the
developing country under the noble justification that this will discourage develop-
ing countries from negotiating a race to the bottom with powerful multinational
enterprises (see Brooks (2007); Pistone (2010)).
Remarkably, developed countries often abstain from compensating their more fa-
vorable domestic tax regimes. Even more remarkable, is the effect that this inter-
national scenario has on multinational enterprises that are stimulated to invest in
complex (and expensive) international tax planning schemes in order to repatriate
the investment of their capital through high tax jurisdictions that exempt foreign
source income and an appropriate use of the diversity of tax treaties around the
world (see Commission (2009)).
This work aims at considering whether the allocation of taxing powers can be
reshaped in a way that allows the developing country to have a “fair share” 2 of
the revenue originated from the exploitation of its territory (Benshalom (2010),
Brauner (2010), Brooks (2009)). The goal of the joint legal and economic analysis
is to secure for each developing country a sound and sustainable tax policy, based
2To be defined below.
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upon the certainty of financial resources, sourced within the same country, con-
sistently with the national policy objectives of that country and without external
interferences (Brauner (2010), Christians (2010), Dagan (2010)).
From a legal perspective, states are free to decide whether or not to conclude a tax
treaty. However, if a treaty exists, the contracting states are obliged to execute it
in good faith, in compliance with the requirements of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. Therefore, insofar as a treaty exists and includes a clause on
the exchange of information, the supply of information will be an ordinary conse-
quence of the obligation to execute the treaty in good faith. Nevertheless, some
years ago the OECD has clarified that requests for information not duly backed
up by accurate documentation, gathered in accordance with the framework of a
preliminary auditing activity, are to be regarded as a “fishing expedition” and
thus do not imply any obligation for the requested contracting state to supply the
information.
From an economic perspective, information asymmetries where a developing coun-
try will have information on firms tax-resident in a developed country can be
solved by giving the developing country the right incentives to share this informa-
tion. These information sharing theories can be implemented in tax treaties. In
these theories, information is considered a tradable good, and thus revenue shar-
ing inevitably will come alongside the exchange of information. Until now such
(economic) theories have received a limited attention among legal taxation experts.
Bacchetta & Espinosa (2000) have analyzed the problem of information sharing
for capital income taxation, demonstrating that information exchange can be sup-
ported only if governments interact repeatedly. Keen & Ligthart (2007) apply the
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concept of information exchange to the EU savings directive. They compare a
scenario without information exchange to a situation with the exchange of infor-
mation, where a country can unilaterally set a withholding tax to retain part of the
tax revenues. Whilst they do not explicitly state it in their paper, the model could
be used to analyze the benefits of signing a tax treaty with revenue sharing and
information exchange, and can thus be considered a special case of the analysis
carried out here.
The first empirical application that investigates the motives for countries to sign
a tax treaty has been carried out by Voget et al. (2011). They find that apart
from reducing or eliminating cross-border double taxation, tax treaties are also
signed to obtain a legal instrument for the exchange of tax information. In this re-
spect, Voget et al. (2011) provide evidence for the theory presented in this chapter.
The current concern about the move towards global fiscal transparency has in-
creased the general awareness of the importance to secure an effective exchange
of information through tax treaties. Therefore, regardless of whether tax treaties
in fact affect foreign direct investment, this study aims at establishing a fair and
effective exercise of the taxing sovereignty on the basis of tax treaties in relations
with developing countries through a mechanism that pursues an effective exchange
of information (Barthel et al. (2010)).
This work regards tax treaties as the only instrument through which developed
countries can obtain the sufficient and objectively reliable information to exercise
their sovereignty on revenue from developing countries (Christians (2005)). How-
ever, developing countries do not necessarily have the relevant infrastructure and
auditing systems for supplying such information, which also entails substantial
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costs for them. Furthermore, insofar as the tax treaty flow of information does not
work properly, developed countries find themselves in a similar situation to that
arising in the absence of a tax treaty. Accordingly, for instance, they would be
unable to check whether transfer pricing within multinational groups effectively
corresponds to the function performed by companies in developing countries with
respect to income sourced in those countries. In such cases, firms may more easily
hide all or a part of their revenues.
3.3 Scope of the work
This work elaborates a model that allows for an effective and sustainable exchange
of information in situations with unidirectional flows of income and capital, as-
suming this to be the most frequently occurring situation between developed and
developing countries. The analysis also takes into account the possible impact of
an effective exchange of information on the mobility of investment by multina-
tional enterprises at the international level, assuming two scenarios in which firms
respectively (i) can and (ii) cannot move to other developing countries.
The mechanism contemplated in this study allocates taxing powers in a way that
makes it affordable for developing countries to sustain the costs of an effective
audit carried out to the standards required by global fiscal transparency (and in
certain cases even to introduce such a system of auditing) and exercise their tax
sovereignty in compliance with their own internal policy. The allocation of taxing
powers allows one contracting state (normally the developed country) to tax the
income up to arm’s length value and the other contracting state (normally the
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developing country) to tax the remaining part of the income. 3
In the following, the design for a modern and fair tax treaty will be presented.
The treaty is modern in the sense that it takes information sharing between con-
tracting states seriously. It is fair in the sense that it will comprise revenue sharing
of tax revenues collected by the developed country. It is assumed that both con-
tracting states are small, and one can therefore treat tax rates as given. For the
sake of simplicity governments are assumed to be Leviathan, and therefor maxi-
mize their own revenues.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section, discusses the situation where
firms are immobile. Though this scenario may not be realistic, it is simple and yet
permits one to show all the main results. This assumption is relaxed in section 3.5.
Within each section, four distinguished cases are needed to be solved, depending
on whether a treaty exists or not, and whether the developing country audits firms
and gathers the necessary data for information sharing or not. The benchmark
case without a treaty is described in the first subsection. Here it is assumed that
the developed country adopts the tax credit method, and unilaterally allows full
deduction of all tax payments to the developing state. 4 The second subsection,
will discuss the alternative case of a treaty, where it is assumed that countries split
the tax base according to the arm’s length transfer pricing principle. In order to
obtain information about its taxpayers from the developing country, the developed
country may be willing to share part of its tax revenues, and this work will indicate
the range of revenue sharing where a tax treaty is feasible.
3A good example of this is the predetermined mechanism currently applicable on a unilateral
basis for determining transfer pricing in the Brazilian tax system.
4This scenario covers the vast majority of all potential international tax cases.
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3.4 The model economy without firm relocation
Consider n ∈ <+ identical multinational firms that produce a fixed quantity, q, of
a homogeneous good in a developing country U . For the ease exposition assume
that firms sell the q goods in a developed country D at a price pd ∈ <+.5 The
sales price pd is constant and known to both countries and normalized to pd = 1.
Firms produce with constant marginal costs c˜i. These costs, by hypothesis, are
stochastic and unknown to both countries. For the sake of simplicity each c˜i is a
random variable which can assume two values: high
(
with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1])
or low
(
with probability (1 − ρ)), i.e. c˜i ∈ {cl, ch}. 6 Note that the developed
country cannot observe the true realization of individual production cost c˜i, but
knows the probability ρ, so that it can foresee the number of firms producing with
a low and high marginal costs.
As quantity neither influences marginal costs nor the sales price, one can assume
that each firm produces exactly one unit of the good, q = 1 without loss of gener-
ality. Expected gross operating profits of firms are therefore given by 1− c, where
c = E(c˜i) = ρch + (1− ρ)cl. In the absence of a tax audit system, firms can claim
any reasonable cost to either country. 7
Both countries can and - in the absence of a tax treaty - will tax each firm i ’s
realized global gross profits 1 − c˜i. 8 Thus, headquarter shopping are excluded.
Finally, assume that there are no firms that produce in D and sell in U .
5Consumers in D are assumed immobile.
6With 0 < cl < ch < pd = 1.
7In our case, firms can claim at most costs of ch.
8For the sake of simplicity assume that D can levy a corporate income tax on revenues in D
even in absence of a subsidiary.
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The developing country U can learn the actual realization of each firm’s c˜i bear-
ing a (sunk) cost M(n), with ∂M(·)
∂n
> 0. By assumption there are fixed costs of
implanting a tax audit system (i.e M(0) > 0). The developed country D cannot
observe or learn the true realization of c˜i and must therefore trust either the firm
or the developing country U ’s claim. In legal terms, country U’s claim can be
dismissed for the absence of any legal obligation of country D to consider it. How-
ever, country D may also find it unsatisfactory to passively import data from the
firms without being able to verify them. This situation has allowed international
tax planning to make use of artificial structures and tax driven schemes for several
decades. This practice is judged highly undesirable in the framework of global
fiscal transparency, which is making considerable progress with the support of the
G20.
3.4.1 No Treaty
In the absence of a tax treaty and firm relocation, the developing country must still
decide whether to implement a tax audit system and thereby reveal information
about its resident firms, in particular about their true costs of production.
The developing country U will decide to audit if and only if tax revenues with
implementation of an audit system, (i.e. T nau ,) are (weakly) greater than tax rev-
enues without audit, T nnu ,
T nau = ntu(1− c)−M(n) ≥ ntu(1− ch) = T nnu (3.1)
where tu ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate in country U .
Lemma 3.1 In absent of a tax treaty, developing country U will decide to imple-
ment an audit system if and only if audit costs are (weakly) inferior to the tax
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revenue gain. Formally,
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c¯) (3.2)
Proof. By the comparison of what country U gets with or without an audit sys-
tem. 
If no treaty is signed and therefore no information is exchanged, country D has
to rely on each firm i’s declaration about costs, irrespective of the implementation
of an audit system in the developing country U . From a legal perspective, this
type of information is generally considered of limited relevance, due to the low
reliability of data that cannot be cross-checked with tax authorities. A different
conclusion is generally only possible for publicly available information, such as for
instance in respect of data required for companies quoted on the stock exchange,
or where the facts are common knowledge. In such circumstances courts generally
acknowledge the right of country D to apply disproportionate measures to prevent
the occurrence of abusive practices (i.e. tax avoidance and evasion).9
In this situation the developed country D does not have the necessary information
about the true realization of firms costs and no way to procure it, so:
Lemma 3.2 In absence of a tax treaty all firms will declare high costs to the
developed country,
ci = ch ∀i ∈ n
and will deduct taxes payed in country U that depends on the implementation
decision of country U .
Proof. Derives from both the fact that each firm i expected profit, E(pii) =
(1−E(c˜))− (1− ci)td, is increasing in the declared cost ci = (cl, ch) (i.e. ∂pii∂ci > 0)
and the absence of uncertainty. 
9see European Court of Justice, decision 18 December 2007, case C-101/05, A.
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In the absence of a tax audit system in the developing country, both countries will
tax the same tax base, and tax revenues in country D will be equal,
T nnd = n(td − tu)(1− ch) (3.3)
where td ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate in country D. By contrast, if U has implemented a
tax audit system, firms will declare true costs to country U and therefore deduct
higher taxes in country D. In this case tax revenues will equal,
T nad = n(td − tu)(1− ch)− ntu(ch − c¯) (3.4)
In the absence of audit, firms hide part of their revenues and therefore evade an
amount of taxes equal to ntd(ch − c).
Without an audit system the global tax revenues are:
T nn = T nnu + T
nn
d = ntd(1− ch) (3.5)
In the presence of audit, the global tax revenues is:
T na = T nau + T
na
d = ntd(1− ch)−M(n) (3.6)
It is important to understand that without a treaty the global taxation is a de-
creasing function of the audit sunk cost M(n). A developed country therefore has
no incentive to support auditing in the developing economy. Global tax revenues
are a function of the tax rate in the developed country, but not of the tax rate in
the developing country due to the foreign tax credit. From a tax policy perspec-
tive of the developing country this may imply that whatever goal is regarded as
relevant and whatever measures can apply for tax purposes, the outcome is simply
random and impossible to predict in advance, thus generating a negative impact
on tax reforms that such country may want to implement for enhancing its tax
governance in compliance with international standards.
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3.4.2 A Treaty
Tax treaties with developing countries typically follow the UN model tax treaty,
where countries agree to exchange information and eliminate double taxation by
splitting firm revenues according to the arm’s length transfer pricing rule. The
arms length principle defines the just transfer price as average production costs
plus a mark-up. Assume that this transfer price equals αc˜i, where α > 1.
Both countries will lose part of the tax base when signing a treaty. The developed
country D could gain from a double tax treaty if this reveals true production costs
of firms. However, the developing country U would unconditionally lose from a
tax treaty, as it could observe true production costs even in the absence of a treaty
through auditing. Developing countries will therefore only voluntarily sign tax
treaties if an element of revenue sharing is included in the treaty.
From a legal perspective traditionally there is opposition against including rev-
enue sharing in tax treaties, since ex post a contracting state is obliged to execute
a treaty in good faith according to the obligations and regardless of what this may
entail. 10 Nonetheless, there are several examples that include elements of revenue
sharing in bilateral tax treaties. A good example, frequently included in Swiss
tax treaties, can be found for taxing income of frontier workers. Another exam-
ple arises in the EU directive (transitional regime) and international agreements
on the taxation of savings. A third example can be found in the Australian tax
treaty practice at the level of the memorandum of understanding that is generally
annexed to tax treaties. Accordingly, this work will now propose that revenue
sharing is to be included in a fair tax treaty with a developing country.
10This may obviously lead to the fact that a contracting state may refrain from signing a treaty
ex ante.
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In order to obtain a voluntary agreement, the developed economy, D, will pro-
pose a compensation fee f for the revelation of information about every firm.
Developed country will offer fl if revealed costs of the firm are low and fh if re-
vealed costs are high.
The timing is as follows: first the developed country D chooses and announces
fh and fl.
11 Then the developing country U decides whether to sign the treaty
or not. Finally, after realization of c˜i (which is not observable by the developed
country), if U signed the contract, it audits the firms, collects taxes if any are due
and pays η · fh + (n − η)fl (where η ∈ [0, n] is the number of firms whose actual
ci = ch) to D.
In order to induce U to sign the treaty and to give a true declaration about the
actual realization of each ci, the developed country D needs to choose the lump
sum fee vector f according to the following condition:
1. Incentive compatibility (IC) When a state piη
12 actually happened, the tax
revenues of the developing country when it declares piη must be (weakly)
greater then its tax revenues when it declares pij for all j ∈ [0, n] different
from η;13
11So fh ≤ fl.
12In this state of the world just η firms have a low revenue while the others (n − η) have the
high one.
13One can firmly believe that this condition is not met in the agreements that Switzerland has
signed in 2011 with Germany and the United Kingdom on the single taxation of savings in the
country of source. Such agreements, designed to preserve anonymity of investors, give the state
of residence, which for the purpose of this research is in a similar situation to country D, no
possibility of cross-checking cases of misreporting or of loose enforcement of taxes by Switzerland.
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2. Participation constraint (PC) the expected tax revenues of the developing
country when it accepts the treaty must be (weakly) greater than what it
gets when it refuses.
If we return to the relations between countries D and U , one can believe that this
structural deficiency of the potential risk of misreporting can be overcome by using
the incentive compatibility condition.
Lemma 3.3 Developed country D will to set a unique fee
f = fl = fh
Proof. Derives directly from the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint. Suppose
that D sets fh 6= fl, then U has an incentive to misreport the correct transfer price
in order to make an unfair profit. So, in order to satisfy the IC and therefore give
the incentive to share the correct information to U , a unique fee must be set. 
In order to satisfy the Participation Constraint (PC) the choice of f depends on
whether in the absence of a treaty with the developing country audits or not,
lemma (3.1). In the following we first analyze the case where condition (3.2) is
satisfied, and thereafter the case when it is not satisfied.
A treaty with audit already in place
If the tax revenue gain from auditing is (weakly) greater than audit costs (that
is condition (3.2) is satisfied), then implementing a monitoring system does not
depend on the treaty, since it will be implemented anyway. If this is the case, then
the developing country U will sign the treaty if tax revenues plus revenue sharing
nf ta exceeds tax revenues in the absence of a treaty,
T tau = ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) + nf ta ≥ T nau (3.7)
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Lemma 3.4 If an audit system is already in place, the developing country U will
sign the treaty if and only if the tax revenue loss of the reduced tax base and audit
costs are (weakly) inferior to the tax revenue gain. Formally, the participation
constraint is satisfied if and only if,
f ta
u
= tu(1− αc) ≤ f ta (3.8)
where f ta
u
is the minimum level of revenue sharing for which country U with an
audit system will be willing to sign the treaty.
Proof. By direct inspection of equation (3.7) .
The developed country D will sign the treaty when audit is already in place if
and only if the tax revenues it receives with the treaty, T tad , are greater than tax
revenues received if it were not signed,
T tad = ntd(1− αc)− nf ta ≤ n(td − tu)(1− ch)− ntu(ch − c¯) = T nad (3.9)
This gives the maximum fee the developed country is willing to pay,
f
ta
d = td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯) ≥ f ta (3.10)
where f
ta
d is the maximum level of revenue sharing for which country D will be
willing to sign the treaty with a developing country with an audit system.
A different conclusion can only be reached when country D wants to promote
good tax governance of country U regardless of an actual return, thus including
for instance an element of development aid. In fact the European Union, currently
the major financial donor in the world, has followed this strategy since 2009.
A treaty is therefore feasible and fiscally rewarding if and only if conditions (3.8)
and (3.10) are both satisfied, i.e. f ta
u
≤ f ta ≤ f tad .
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A treaty initially without audit
If audit costs are greater than the tax revenue gain, U will not implement the audit
system in the absence of the treaty. This means that in the absence of a treaty
it will get a payoff of T nnu , defined in equation (3.1), since each firm i will declare
high costs ch (lemma 3.2), and it will get T
tn
u if it signs the treaty. The problem
of the developing country U consists of choosing whether or not to sign the treaty
in order to maximize its tax revenues. It will accept the treaty if and only if:
T tnu = ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) + nf tn ≥ ntu(1− ch) = T nnu (3.11)
Lemma 3.5 If an audit system is not yet in place, the developing country U will
sign the treaty if and only if the fee plus the net tax revenues gain are (weakly)
greater than the cost of the audit system. Formally,
f tn
u
= tu(1− αc) + M(n)
n
− tu(ch − c¯) ≤ f tn (3.12)
where f tn
u
is the minimum level of revenue sharing for which country U without an
audit system will be willing to sign the treaty.
Proof. By direct inspection of equation (3.11) .
This pattern is in substance linked to the recent developments concerning the
Global Forum on Fiscal Transparency. Since 2009 countries are willing to sign
tax treaties with exchange of information provisions in order not to be listed in
the groups of uncooperative tax jurisdictions and be internationally blamed for
not effectively countering tax avoidance and evasion. For this reason a develop-
ing country may be willing to sign a tax treaty with an exchange of information
clause even when it knows that such clause will in fact not yield any advantage
with respect to its tax revenue. However, the developing country, even in such
circumstances, will not effectively carry out tax audits unless it believes that it
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may gain from them.
Comparing lemma 3.4 and lemma 3.5 it is now clear that in addition to the com-
pensation of the loss of tax base as in condition (3.8), the developed country must
now also compensate the developing country for the implementation of a tax audit
system, which is the last part of the above condition (3.12) and replicates condi-
tion (3.2).
Similarly as above, the developed country D will sign the treaty when audit was
not already in place if and only if the tax revenues it receives with the treaty
exceed tax revenues without the treaty,
T tnd = ntd(1− αc)− nf tn ≥ n(td − tu)(1− ch) = T nnd (3.13)
which leads to,
f
tn
d = td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch) ≥ f tn (3.14)
where f
tn
d is the maximum level of revenue sharing for which country D will be
willing to sign the treaty with a developing country without an audit system.
The first term is the tax gain when a treaty is signed. The second term by contrast
is the tax revenue loss due to the ceasure of taxing rights to the developing country
U . The two conditions for the developed economy, equations (3.10) and (3.14),
differ only by the amount tu(ch − c). If no audit system was in place before the
treaty, the developed country can offer a lower compensation for the developing
country U , as it can fully appropriate the higher tax revenues of the developing
country U resulting from auditing.
A treaty is feasible if and only if conditions (3.12) and (3.14) are both satisfied,
i.e. f tn
u
≤ f tn ≤ f tnd .
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3.4.3 Discussion
Jointly equations (3.10) and (3.14) give the maximum level of revenue sharing, fd,
for which developed country D will sign the treaty:
fd =
 td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯) = f
ta
d if audit is already in place
f
ta
d − tu(ch − c¯) = f
tn
d if audit is not in place
(3.15)
Lemma 3.4 and lemma 3.5 define the minimum level of revenue sharing, fu, that
the developing country U is willing to accept.
fu =
 tu(1− αc) = f
ta
u if audit is already in place
f
ta
u +
M(n)
n
− tu(ch − c¯) = f tnu if audit is not in place
(3.16)
We can plot these conditions in a graph in the f to M(n)
n
space.
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The model implies an unambiguously positive level of revenue sharing. The com-
pensation will therefore be the result of a bargaining process and - depending on
the bargaining power of the two parties - fall in between the minimum level of
revenue sharing required by the developing economy U and the maximum level of
revenue sharing offered by the developed countryD (blue lines in the graph above).
Let us define the difference between the maximum revenue sharing fee offered
by the developed country and the minimum revenue sharing fee requested by the
developing country as:
b =
 f
ta
d − f tau = td(ch − αc) + tu(α− 1)c = bta if audit is already in place
f
tn
d − f tnu = bta −M(n)/n = btn if audit is not in place
(3.17)
The following proposition is obtained:
Proposition 3.1 (1) A tax treaty is welfare improving for both countries if and
only if b ≥ 0. (2) When tax rates in developed countries exceed tax rates in
developing countries, td > tu, the bargaining space b is a decreasing function in the
transfer price α.
Proof. The first part is trivial and the second is derived by direct inspection of
equation (3.17). 
The first part of proposition 3.1 holds always but for the unlikely case that the
average arm’s length price exceeds the maximum cost by a very large amount, one
can ensure that a tax treaty is possible.
Proposition 3.1 shows that the transfer price α plays a central role on both coun-
tries decision to sign the treaty. After the treaty is signed the transfer price
becomes the driver that splits the tax base between the two countries.
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In fact α is an income tax base multiplier for the developing country U, since
the treaty gives the right to U to tax firm’s income produced in its region (i.e.
(αc− c)), but it is a cost multiplier for the developed country D which has a tax
base equal to (1− αc).
One can identify the transfer price for which both countries are indifferent be-
tween signing the treaty or not:
α =
 1c(td−tu)
(
tdch − tuc
)
if M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c) with audit system
1
c(td−tu)
(
tdch − tuc− M(n)n
)
if M(n) ≥ ntu(ch − c) without audit system
One can plot these conditions in the following graph:
tuIch - cM
The treaty is signed
U always
audit Audit is
introduced
The treaty is not signed
1 M
n
Α
The bold line on the graph above represents at each possible cost of audit M(n)
the maximum level of the transfer price for which both countries are just willing
to sign the treaty. The intuition is that the greater the cost of auditing M(n) the
greater the developed country D share of tax base has to be (i.e. a lower α) for
the treaty to be signed. If audit costs exceed the potential minimum gain from
negotiating a treaty, M(n)/n > b ⇔ f tn
u
> f
tn
d , then no treaty will voluntarily be
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signed.
Interestingly, a treaty can stimulate a developing country to introduce a tax audit
system together with a tax treaty, even if initially an audit system is too expensive
to be implemented, f
tn
d − f tau ⇔ td ≥ tu. This convenience is enhanced when ad-
ditional funds are made available by international organizations or supranational
entities, like the EU, for the specific purpose of improving compliance with stan-
dards of good governance and thus increase the ability of the developing country
to raise sufficient revenue from taxes collected within its jurisdiction. As long as
the tax level is given the treaty acts as it increases the tax rate in U and the tax
base in D. Moreover a treaty can end the evasion phenomenon since firms will
declare truthfully. Obviously, there will be no treaty with developing countries
that exhibit excessive audit costs.
Another interesting results is presented by the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2 A treaty is feasible and welfare improving if and only if total tax
revenues are increasing with the treaty. Formally,
T t ≥ T n ↔ b ≥ 0
Proof. Summing either equations 3.7 and 3.9 or 3.11 and 3.13 yields global tax
revenues with a treaty irrespective of the initial audit decision,
T t = T tau + T
ta
d = T
tn
u + T
tn
d = ntd(1− αc) + ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) (3.18)
we find that T t = T na+nbta = T nn+nbtn which shows that total taxation (weakly)
increases with the treaty if and only if b ≥ 0. 
Results above show under which conditions countries are willing to sign a tax
treaty voluntarily where they truthfully exchange information. As proved above
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such treaties will only come to place if the country in need of information is willing
to share a nonzero part of these additional revenues with the other country. The
discussion above has also proven that the developing country has no convenience
to misreport information to the developed country. Moreover the conclusion of a
treaty can induce the developing country to implement a tax audit system. The
next section, analyzes whether these conclusions hold under the condition (and
real possibility) that firms may leave (or enter) a country that has just signed a
treaty.
3.5 The model economy with the decision to re-
locate
Capital is internationally mobile , and firms can relocate their production at will
to any third country upon bearing a relocation cost k. For simplicity, assume
that third countries levy the same tax rate tu as the developing country U under
consideration.
3.5.1 No treaty
First, suppose that the developing country has neither a tax treaty nor an efficient
tax audit system. Then the firm will claim as before high costs in both countries
(lemma 3.2 still holds) and be taxed according to the global income principle,
yielding expected profits of
pinns = (1− c)− td(1− ch) (3.19)
in case it decides to stay. Profits are given by revenues (normalized to unity) minus
expected production costs c, and minus tax payments on declared profits to the
developed country D, since taxes payed in U can be deducted. Suppose, now, that
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firms can move paying a reallocation cost k. The profit of a single firm in case it
decides to move to another country without audit and treaty will be
pinnn = pinns − k (3.20)
In the absence of a proper tax audit or a tax treaty, the foreign tax credit method
impedes firms to relocate, as profits of relocating firms (3.20) are weakly lower than
profits of remaining firms (3.19), pinnn ≤ pinns. Note that the foreign tax credit
method impedes tax competition between developing countries, as their respective
tax rates are irrelevant for the locational decision of foreign firms, equations (3.19)
and (3.20). Tax revenues in the developed and the developing country respectively
are T nnsu = ntu(1− ch) and T nnsd = n(td − tu)(1− ch).
Second, suppose now that the developing economy implements a tax audit sys-
tem, but does not communicate the findings to the developed economy due to
the lack of a treaty. If the developed country D offers tax deductions following
the foreign tax credit method, firms can deduct all the taxes payed in country
U . Profits in the case where firms do not relocate are identical to the case in the
absence of auditing (3.19), pinas = pinns. Profits in the case where firms relocate
are also identical to the case in the absence of auditing (3.20), pinan = pinnn. Firms
will again decide to remain in the developing country U given (weakly) positive
moving costs, k ≥ 0.
Lemma 3.6 Independently of the developing country U audit decision, each firm’s
best strategy is to decide not to relocate to another developing country U for any
possible (weakly) positive moving cost k ≥ 0.
Proof. From the comparison of what each firm gets if it decides to relocate or not
(discussion above). 
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If an audit system is already in place, tax revenues in the developed country differ
since firms deduct a higher amount of taxes. Tax revenues in the developed country
equal T nasd = ntd(1 − ch) − ntu(1 − c¯), whereas for the developing country they
change to T nasu = ntu(1− c¯)−M(n). As opposed to the case without auditing, the
developed country D will now receive lower tax revenues as firms will now deduct
higher tax payments to the developing country U of the amount tu(ch − c). The
developing country by contrast gains these tax revenues, but has to pay auditing
costs of M(n). The developing country U prefers to implement a tax audit system
if T nasu ≥ T nnsu , or
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c¯). (3.21)
This means that an audit system will be implemented if the tax gain is greater
than the auditing costs. Again we obtain the result already presented in lemma
3.1.
3.5.2 A Treaty
As in the absence of a relocation decision, a treaty with information exchange and
revenue sharing is considered. Note that in the absence of auditing, the developed
economy will not benefit from a treaty, and will therefore not be willing to share
tax revenues. This case is therefore identical to the no treaty/no audit case dis-
cussed in section 3.4.1 above.
With the conclusion of a tax treaty, firms are now aware that information about
their true cost structure will be shared with the developed economy. By contrast,
a treaty eliminates double taxation according to the worldwide income taxation
principle with foreign tax credit14, and firms will now declare part of their prof-
14Considering that tax treaties generally apply the ordinary tax credit method, this is possible
only to the extent that taxes, as it is often the case levied by the developing country (usually
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its in the developing country U , which might offer lower tax rates. If the prior
effect dominates, firms can expect to pay higher taxes and may consider relocation.
In order to prevent capital flight, the developing country U may consider the
possibility to pay a subsidy, s, in order to induce firms to stay. One can think of
these subsidies either as a reduction in the tax rate offered to firms considering
relocation, where the effective tax rate will be τu = tu − s/(αc¯ − c¯), or a transfer
in kind (e.g. infrastructure), which would reduce production costs. In either case,
the subsidy given is a form of tax competition. 15 Profits in case the firm leaves
are given by equation (3.20) above, whereas if the firm remains they are given by
pitas = (1− c¯)− tu(α− 1)c¯− td(1− αc¯) + s (3.22)
The optimal subsidy to firms from the perspective of the developing country U
now equals
s ≥ tu(α− 1)c¯+ td(ch − αc¯)− k (3.23)
The first part represents taxes payed in U , whereas the second term controls for
taxes evaded in D in the absence of a treaty, and the last part is the moving
cost. Firms can therefore claim all taxes paid to the developing country U short
of relocation costs k, and will receive the additional taxes paid to the developed
country D back from the developing country through the subsidy s. With very
high relocation costs, this subsidy could, in theory, be negative, and developing
countries could in principle appropriate these rents. Substituting subsidies from
the country of source) are lower than those levied by the developed country.
15However, in several parts of the world this option remains merely theoretical, since some
legal obstacles may prevent its implementation. This is certainly the case of the European
Union, where this type of incentives is in principle incompatible with the provision of state aids
and needs an explicit ex-ante approval by the European Commission in order to lawfully apply.
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above, one finds that tax revenues will equal
T tasu = nf
tas
u
+ nk − ntd(ch − αc¯)−M(n) (3.24)
Note that tax revenues depend on tax rates in the developed economy due to the
subsidy. The developed economy will receive revenues equal to
T tasd = ntd(1− αc¯)− nf
tas
d (3.25)
3.5.3 Discussion
Once again, one has to distinguish two cases indicated by condition (3.21), whether
audit is already in place before signing the treaty, M(n) ≤ ntu(ch− c¯), or not. On
the one hand, if audit was already in place before signing the treaty, the developing
country will accept the treaty if and only if tax revenues under a treaty exceed tax
revenues without a treaty, T tasu ≥ T nasu or
f tas
u
≥ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯)− k
The developed country will accept the treaty if and only if tax revenues under a
treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty, T tasd ≥ T nasd or
f
tas
d ≤ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯)
Note that f tas
u
= f
tas
d − k. Hence the developed country D will be willing to
offer a revenue sharing fee that will exceed the revenue sharing fee requested by
the developing country U for any nonnegative relocation costs k ≥ 0. The treaty
surplus b, that was generated in the absence of firm relocation, is now entirely
absorbed by firms through subsidies, where applicable. By contrast, the relocation
costs k generate a different rent that opens a new bargaining space k. Let us define
global taxation as the sum of both countries’ tax revenues: T nas = T nasd + T
nas
u =
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ntd(1− ch)−M(n) is the global taxation if no treaty is signed and T tas = T tasd +
T tasu = ntd(1− ch) + nk −M(n). So:
T tas ≥ T nas → k > 0
This means that the global taxation is increasing in the treaty if and only if there
exists a positive cost for each firm to move.
On the other hand, if auditing was initially not in place and condition (3.21)
was not satisfied, M(n) ≥ ntu(ch − c¯), the developing country will accept the
treaty if and only if tax revenues under a treaty exceed tax revenues without a
treaty, T tnsu = T
tas
u ≥ T nnsu or
f tns
u
≥ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch) +M(n)/n− k
The developed country by contrast will accept the treaty if and only if tax revenues
under a treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty, T tnsd = T
tas
d ≥ T nasd or
f
tns
d ≤ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch)
The minimum revenue sharing fee acceptable for the developing country will be
lower than the maximum revenue sharing fee offered by the developed country if
M(n) ≤ nk − ntd(1− ch)
Together with condition (3.21), this identifies the space were a treaty is feasible
even if there was no auditing initially, namely when relocation costs are high, or
k ≥ td(1− ch) + tu(ch − c¯)
As before global taxation in the absence of a tax treaty equals T nns = T nnsd +T
nns
u =
ntd(1 − ch) and T tns = T tnsd + T tnsu = ntd(1 − ch) + nk −M(n) under a treaty.
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Global tax revenues under a treaty are larger if relocation costs exceed auditing
costs, or
T tas ≥ T nas → nk > M(n)
This means that global taxation is increasing with the treaty if and only if the cost
for each firm to move is greater than the cost for the developing country to audit it.
The following proposition summarize all the results presented in the previous dis-
cussion:
Proposition 3.3 A treaty is welfare improving if and only global taxation is in-
creasing with the treaty. This is always true if the cost for each firm to move is
greater than the cost for the developing country to audit it, and in particular for
any positive moving cost if an audit system is already in place. Formally:
T t ≥ T n ↔
 k ≥ 0 if audit is already in placek ≥ M(n)
n
if audit is not in place
(3.26)
Proposition 3.3 shows a very similar result to the one given in proposition 3.2.
Note that for the common case where tax rates in the developed economy ex-
ceed tax rates in the developing economy, td > tu, the subsidy is increasing in the
arm’s length pricing mark-up α. Developing countries need not pay a subsidy if
the mark-up is defined according to
α =
tdch − tuc− k
(td − tu)c
Substituting the minimum subsidy feasible from equation (3.23) into the profit
function (3.22), one finds that net profits will equal pitas = (1− c¯)− td(1− ch)− k.
Together, the developed and the developing country can levy at most the developed
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countries tax rate on the minimum declarable tax base 1−ch and skim off relocation
costs. Tax revenues in the developing economy will consist of profit taxation of
firms, revenue sharing from the developed country, minus subsidies to firms and
audit costs.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has departed from the observation that worldwide income taxation
in the country of residence is a global legal dogma of international taxation. This
work has questioned this dogma from the perspective of relations with developing
countries from a legal and economic perspective, and made a modern and fair pro-
posal for tax treaties. It has supported a new vision of how taxing rights should be
allocated in a treaty between a developed and a developing country. It argues that
developed countries should share tax revenues with developing countries, as this
is mutually beneficial. Developing countries will receive revenues, and developed
countries obtain information on its tax subjects through voluntary exchange of in-
formation. The proposal for a new allocation of taxing powers reflects inter-state
fairness that should secure consistency with international tax justice goals and
achieve and objective standard of splitting taxing powers on cross-border income
in compliance with internationally accepted standards, such as the arm’s length
principle. This research has shown under which conditions a developing and a de-
veloped country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged
truthfully and when they should share revenues. Moreover, this work has demon-
strated how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a
tax audit system.
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Concluding Remarks and Future
Research
Understanding the effects of fiscal policies is important since they have the poten-
tial to be used for economic growth and stabilization. Clearly governments have
not lost their taste for using fiscal policy aimed at short-term objectives, while
taxpayers can always behave illegally.
The question of a taxpayers’ optimal strategy in the presence of the cut-off rule
described in chapter two is relevant because it is not unusual for such a policy to be
the main source of unfairness and an obstacle for new small businesses and prac-
titioners. Implementing this policy requires a lot of information to be gathered by
the government and, under these circumstances, while the governments best policy
consists of setting a threshold value accordingly to its audit budget, a taxpayer’s
optimal strategy consist of either declaring the threshold value or declaring their
true income according to their type. Taxpayers are therefore divided, accordingly
to their types, into three homogeneous groups; one of which pays more taxes than
due (Over-Declaration), another complies but bears the audit cost, while the third
evades and it is not audited.
Chapter three, starting from the fact that worldwide income taxation, in the coun-
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try of residence is a global legal dogma of international taxation, has questioned
this dogma from the perspective of relations with developing countries from a legal
and economic perspective. Since such a dogma hampers growth, a modern and
fair proposal for tax treaties has been proposed. The chapter has supported a
modern vision of how taxing rights should be allocated in a treaty between a de-
veloped and a developing country. It argues that developed countries should share
tax revenues with developing countries, as this is mutually beneficial. Developing
countries will receive revenues, and developed countries obtain information on its
tax subjects through voluntary exchange of information. The proposal for a new
allocation of taxing powers reflects inter-state fairness that should be consistent
with international tax justice goals and achieve the standard objective of splitting
taxing powers on cross-border income in compliance with internationally accepted
standards, such as the arm’s length principle. This research has shown under which
conditions a developing and a developed country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty
where information is exchanged truthfully and when they should share revenues.
Moreover, it has demonstrated how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the
implementation of a tax audit system.
The deduction of the foreign tax by the country of residence 16 reduces the possi-
bilities of developing countries to attract foreign capital through tax policy. Thus
tax competition between developing countries is hampered since a reduction of
such tax by the country of source (developing country) turns into a lower deduc-
tion against taxes due in the country of residence (developed country). Intuitively
in such a situation, as the analysis in chapter three has already showed, firms do
not take into account the tax rates of the developing countries when they have to
choose where to allocate their production. For this reason, any tax policy develop-
16i.e. relief for juridical double taxation by the so-called foreign tax credit method.
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ing countries could think of, has no effect on the number of firms in their territory.
Thus Tax competition is hampered.
Interestingly, this is not the case if the developing countries, where the firms are
active, sign a tax treaty that states a clear allocation of taxing rights between the
country of source and residence. If a treaty, such as the one proposed in chapter
three is signed, the taxes due to the developing country became final and so firms
become concerned about them. Here tax competition is created.
While tax competition has been viewed from the literature as a “wasteful competi-
tion” for scarce capital, that governments engage because they act independently
following their own country interests, that results in a reduction of public expen-
diture and tax rate levels (Oates (1972), p. 143), it would be interesting to know
if these conclusions 17 still hold in the game of the noncoperative choice of taxes
developing countries could use to attract foreign capital. This could be object to
further research.
17One of the predicted outcomes from the models in tax competition is the so called “race to
the bottom”, if all countries starts with a positive capital tax.
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Appendix A
Unconstrained Government
Problem
In this appendix we keep all the previous assumptions of the model described in the
second chapter but we now assume that the government has no budget problem.
Therefore the government’s problem is now the following:
max
g
I¯∫
l
(tI − k) dF (I) +
h∫
I¯
tg dF (I) (A.1)
The first order condition is:
t ·
I¯∫
h
f(I) dI
f(I¯)
= −k − c (A.2)
Using the assumption of uniformly distributed income, we get:
g∗ = h− k
t
(A.3)
Therefore we get the following proposition:
Proposition A.1 The optimal government threshold strategy is : (1) increasing
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in the highest cluster income level h, (2) decreasing in its audit cost k, (3) increas-
ing in the tax rate t. Formally:
(1)
∂g∗
∂h
> 0 (2)
∂g∗
∂k
< 0 (3)
∂g∗
∂t
> 0
Proof. By direct inspection of equation (A.3). 
The equation (A.3) highlights the fact that the threshold value g∗ can be equal
to the highest cluster income level h only if either the government’s audit cost is
equal to zero (k = 0) or the tax rate is infinity (t = +∞).
As one can easily notice the fine f has no impact on the threshold choice, nei-
ther in the constraint problem nor in this one. This is due to the fact that in our
case any evaders are caught.
Appendix B
Augmenting the Model with the
Audit Probability Choice
The aim of this appendix is to analyze the taxpayer evasion decision in a frame-
work where one keeps all the previous assumptions of the model presented in the
second chapter but now one assumes that the government can chose not only the
threshold value but also the audit probability reports below it bear. So, first the
government choses and announces both the threshold value g and the audit prob-
ability for reports below it, ρ.
Therefore, a taxpayer of type Ii, solves the following problem:
max
di
ui = Ii − tdi − bi
[
max
{
0, (Ii − di)
}
(t+ f) + c
]
(B.1)
Where bi is a step function defined as follows:
bi =
 ρ if di < g0 if di ≥ g (B.2)
and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the audit probability.
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Now, the optimal declaration will be a function of the taxpayer’s type and the
audit probability. Again, the same two cases need to be considered, when tax-
payer i’s type is low, Ii < g and when it is high, Ii ≥ g.
Since the audit probability is unchanged for reports above the threshold value,
the same argument presented in section 2.3.1 can be applied, and so conclude that
“declaring the threshold value g” strictly dominates “declaring more than g”, in-
dependently of agent’s type.
By the previous argument a high type taxpayer’s decision depends on the compar-
ison between a full evasion declaration di = 0 and a threshold declaration di = g.
This case is characterized by the following proposition:
Proposition B.1 High type taxpayers (Ii > g) always evade, the amount of their
evasion will depend on the audit probability ρ. Formally:
d∗(Ii, g, ρ) =
 0 if ρ < ρˆg if ρ ≥ ρˆ (B.3)
where ρˆ := tg
((t+f)Ii+c)
.
Proof. From the comparison of the expected utilities a high type agent (Ii > g)
gets when they declare the threshold value g (udi=gi = Ii − tg) and when they
report a zero income declaration (udi=0i = Ii − ρ · ((t+ f)I + c)).
Intuitively, if the audit probability ρ is not too high, high-type taxpayers (Ii > g)
fully evade making a zero income declaration. This implies that their optimal
declaration is (weakly) increasing in the audit probability ρ.
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A low type taxpayer’s decision depends on the comparison between a full eva-
sion declaration di = 0, truthful declaration di = Ii and a threshold declaration
di = g, as follows:
d∗(Ii, g, ρ) =

0 if ρ < ρ∗
∈ {0, Ii} if ρ = ρ∗ and Ii < I˜
Ii if ρ > ρ
∗ and Ii < I˜
g if ρ ≥ ρ∗ and I˜ ≤ Ii < g
(B.4)
where ρ∗ := t
(t+f)
is the probability that eliminates evasion for low type agents,
and I˜ := g − ρ · c
t
is the taxpayer who is indifferent between declaring her real
income Ii or the threshold value g. From the equation (B.4) it is clear that a
low-type taxpayer’s declaration is (weakly) increasing in the audit probability and
in her gross income.
Low type taxpayers evade only if the probability is not too high, i.e ρ < ρ∗. If it
is not the case, that is the audit probability is at least ρ∗, then the critical type I˜
enters the picture. A taxpayer i of that type is indifferent between declaring her
real income or the threshold value. Note that this critical type inversely depends
on the audit probability. This implies that its minimum value is reached when ρ
is equal to one as in the original model. When it is so, the fake (over-declaring)
congruous group will reach its limit. The idea is that reducing the audit proba-
bility ρ, the interval of income types who prefer to pay taxes accordingly to gerico
rather than comply and bear the audit cost, decreases.
Jointly proposition B.1 and equation B.4 completely characterize the solution to
the taxpayer’s problem in the situation where the government decides both the
threshold value and the audit probability.
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